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REGULATORY CHALLENGES FOR TREATING FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
FCOI AS RESEARCH MISCONDUCT IN PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH
Tammy M. Frisby*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2018, The New York Times reported that world-renowned cancer
researcher José Baselga, Chief Medical Officer of Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer
Center in New York, had repeatedly failed to disclose in publications and
presentations his significant personal financial ties to pharmaceutical companies as
required by both the American Association for Cancer Research and the editorial
policies of academic journals.1 Following on the reporting about Baselga, physician
and medical ethicist Jeffrey Botkin argues in an opinion piece in the Journal of the
American Medical Association that “[i]t is time to strengthen institutional [financial
conflict of interest] policies by considering the intentional or negligent failure to
disclose significant financial relationships relevant to the conduct of research to be
research misconduct.”2 Botkin argues that compliance with institutional financial
conflict of interest (FCOI) disclosure requirements may be improved by creating an
incentive for scientific investigators to avoid the damage to professional reputation
associated with a finding of “research misconduct.”3 In addition to his normative
contention that “serious noncompliance” with institutional FCOI disclosure
requirements should be treated as research misconduct, Botkin suggests that existing
federal regulations may provide legal authority for Public Health Service (PHS)
*
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1
Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Top Cancer Researcher Fails to Disclose
Corporate Financial Ties in Major Research Journals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/health/jose-baselga-cancer-memorial-sloan-kettering
.html [https://perma.cc/472G-BDQT]. See generally Jorge L. Contreras & Marc Daniel
Rinehart, Conflicts of Interest and Academic Research, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (Jacob H. Rooksby ed., 2020)
(providing an overview of research on the effects of conflicts of interest on academic research
as well as a survey of governmental, institutional, and academic journal conflict of interest
policies).
2
Jeffrey R. Botkin, Viewpoint, Should Failure to Disclose Significant Financial
Conflicts of Interest Be Considered Research Misconduct?, 320 JAMA 2307, 2307 (2018).
3
Id. at 2308.
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agencies, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to address a PHS-funded
researcher’s “serious noncompliance” with institutional FCOI disclosure
requirements as research misconduct.4
This Note assesses the viability of treating failure to disclose FCOI as research
misconduct under current law. I find that existing federal regulations likely do not
provide legal authority for NIH or other PHS funding-agencies to address failure to
disclose FCOI as research misconduct. After providing an overview of current PHS
regulations on FCOI and research misconduct, the Note considers four features of
administrative law governing bias and integrity in PHS-funded research: (a) the
definition of “research misconduct” under current regulations; (b) the regulatory
standards for a finding of “research misconduct”; (c) the intent behind the 2004–
2005 rulemaking process that revised research misconduct policies across federal
agencies; and (d) the regulatory structure within Title 42 of the C.F.R. that was
created by the 2004–2005 rulemaking process. Based on existing PHS regulations
and the purpose behind the federal policy that guided the 2004–2005 rulemaking on
research misconduct, it seems unlikely that current law supports treating even the
most serious cases of failure to disclose FCOI in itself as research misconduct in
violation of PHS regulations. This Note presents alternative recommendations for
action by research institutions and PHS funding-agencies to address “serious
noncompliance” with FCOI disclosure.
II. BACKGROUND
PHS research falls under the purview of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and its eight public health service agencies, including NIH.5 In fiscal
year 2018, NIH awarded $27.1 million in grants and contracts to support medical

4

Id. (“To [Botkin’s] knowledge, the [Department of Health and Human Services Office
of Research Integrity] has not explicitly addressed whether noncompliance with [F]COI
regulations or policy could constitute research misconduct[,]” but Botkin interprets federal
regulatory guidance as supportive of addressing FCOI disclosure noncompliance under
federal research misconduct policy).
5
The eight designated PHS agencies within HHS are: Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ), Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Indian Health Service (IHS), National
Institutes of Health (NIH), and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA). HHS Agencies & Offices, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/hhsagencies-and-offices/index.html [https://perma.cc/66ZG-YQKC] (last visited July 30,
2020).
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research.6 Under current law, FCOI disclosure and research misconduct in PHSfunded research are regulated by 42 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 93, respectively.7
The PHS regulations governing FCOI disclosure for PHS-funded research are
codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601–607.8 Under PHS regulations, a “financial conflict
of interest” is defined as “a significant financial interest that could directly and
significantly affect the design, conduct, or reporting of PHS-funded research.”9 At
42 C.F.R. §§ 50.604–605, the rules assign research institutions the responsibility to
establish institutional FCOI disclosure requirements and management plans for
PHS-funded researchers, as well as procedures for reporting FCOI to the PHSfunding agency, consistent with 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601–607.10 When an institution
discovers that an FCOI was not disclosed by an “investigator,”11 the institution must
conduct “a retrospective review of the [i]nvestigator’s activities and the PHS-funded
research project to determine whether any PHS-funded research . . . conducted
during the time period of noncompliance, was biased in the design, conduct, or
reporting of such research.”12 Although a PHS funding-agency, under 42 C.F.R. §
50.606(b), may decide to take additional corrective action by imposing specific
award conditions under 45 C.F.R. § 75.207, or suspending funding or taking other
enforcement action under 45 C.F.R. § 75.371, the research institution is primarily
responsible for taking corrective action in response to a PHS-funded researcher’s
failure to disclose FCOI, based on its institutional policies.13
6
Table #106 NIH Research Grants and Other Mechanisms Including Research and
Development Contracts, NIH, https://report.nih.gov/DisplayRePORT.aspx?rid=569
[https://perma.cc/RTF8-VX79] (last visited June 7, 2020) (fiscal year 2018 total contained
in spreadsheet cell located at row 277, column C).
7
42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601–607 (2019) (FCOI disclosure rules are contained in part 50,
subpart F titled “Promoting Objectivity in Research”); id. §§ 93.100–523 (part 93 titled
“Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct”).
8
Id. §§ 50.601–607.
9
Id. § 50.603 (providing a definition of “significant financial interest”; under current
regulations, the threshold for a “significant” interest is set at $5,000 and applies to financial
interests held by the investigator, as well as the investigator’s spouse and dependent children,
which “reasonably appears to be related to the [i]nvestigator’s institutional responsibilities”).
10
Id. § 50.604 (subsection heading: “Responsibilities of Institutions regarding
Investigator financial conflicts of interest”); id. § 50.605 (subsection heading: “Management
and reporting of financial conflicts of interest”); id. §§ 50.601–607 (FCOI rules).
11
Id. § 50.603 (defining “Investigator” as used in the subpart as “the project director or
principal Investigator and any other person, regardless of title or position, who is responsible
for the design, conduct, or reporting of research funded by the PHS, or proposed for such
funding, which may include, for example, collaborators or consultants”).
12
Id. § 50.605(a)(3)(ii)(A).
13
Id. § 50.606(b); 45 C.F.R. §§ 75.207, 75.371 (2019); 42 C.F.R. § 50.605 (2019); see
also id. § 50.606(c) (establishing federal requirement for PHS-funded institutions to rectify
FCOI nondisclosure related to PHS-funded clinical research whose purpose is to evaluate
the safety or effectiveness of medical drugs, devices, or treatment that “[have] been designed,
conducted, or reported by an [i]nvestigator with a financial conflict of interest that was not
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Research misconduct is regulated by 42 C.F.R. §§ 93.100–523.14 Under PHS
regulations, “[r]esearch misconduct means fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in
proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research results.”15 A
finding of research misconduct requires: “(a) There be a significant departure from
accepted practices of the relevant research community; and (b) The misconduct be
committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; and (c) The allegations be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence.”16
Following a similar structure to FCOI regulations in 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.604–605,
research institutions are responsible for identifying and addressing research
misconduct by their PHS-funded investigators consistent with 42 C.F.R. Part 93.17
Unlike FCOI regulations, however, the research misconduct rules in 42 C.F.R. Part
93 establish a procedure to which institutions must adhere when addressing
allegations of research misconduct.18 Upon receipt of an allegation of research
misconduct, institutions must notify HHS and convene an inquiry committee tasked
with determining whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a full investigation
by a separate investigative committee at the institution.19
In contrast to the handling of FCOI, 42 C.F.R. §§ 93.400–414 grants HHS,
through the independent Office of Research Integrity (ORI), extensive authority to
review and take corrective action following a finding of research misconduct.20 In
addition to assisting and advising institutions conducting their own research
misconduct proceedings, ORI “may respond directly to any allegation of research
misconduct at any time before, during, or after an institution’s response to the
matter.”21 ORI may make its own finding of research misconduct and propose
administrative action to HHS.22 Unlike the FCOI regulations in 42 C.F.R. Part 50,
which have limited reference to HHS-imposed sanctions and refer to another Title
of the C.F.R. for possible sanctions,23 42 C.F.R. Part 93 includes specific HHS
administrative actions to be taken by HHS in response to research misconduct.24
HHS administrative actions in response to a finding of research misconduct range
from special review of all future requests for PHS funding to suspension or
managed or reported by the [i]nstitution as required by this subpart; the [i]nstitution shall
require the [i]nvestigator involved to disclose the financial conflict of interest in each public
presentation of the results of the research and to request an addendum to previously published
presentations”).
14
42 C.F.R. §§ 93.100–523 (2019).
15
Id. § 93.103 (definition of research misconduct).
16
Id. § 93.104 (standards for a finding of research misconduct).
17
Id. §§ 50.604–605; id. §§ 93.300–306.
18
Id. §§ 93.307–316.
19
Id. §§ 93.307, 93.310.
20
Id. §§ 93.400–414.
21
Id. § 93.400(a), (d).
22
Id. § 93.400.
23
Id. § 50.606.
24
Id. § 93.407.
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debarment from receiving federal funds.25 HHS may also “seek to recover PHS
funds spent in support of the activities that involved research misconduct.”26
III. ANALYSIS
The idea of penalizing scientific investigators for “serious noncompliance”
with FCOI disclosure requirements by formally tagging such behavior with the
academic scarlet letter of research misconduct is intriguing. But my analysis of
current law and policy concludes that an effort by PHS funding-agencies to treat
failure to disclose FCOI in itself as research misconduct is unlikely to be sustained
by the courts under existing federal regulations. Four features of administrative law
regulating research bias and objectivity would support a legal challenge to PHS
regulatory action: (a) the full definition of research misconduct under current
regulations; (b) the regulatory standards for a finding of “research misconduct”; (c)
the intent behind the 2004–2005 rulemaking process for revised research misconduct
policies across federal agencies; and (d) the regulatory structure created by the
2004–2005 rulemaking process.
A. Definition of Research Misconduct Under 42 C.F.R. § 93.103
To refresh, under PHS regulations, “[r]esearch misconduct means fabrication,
falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in
reporting research results.”27 In Botkin’s view, an investigator’s failure to disclose
significant financial relationships with entities related to the investigator’s research
constitutes research misconduct as defined by 42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b) because such
nondisclosure could be deemed “falsification.”28 However, when the definitions
provided for the terms that fall within the definition of “research misconduct” under
42 C.F.R. § 93.103 are considered, it seems unlikely a court would interpret 42
C.F.R. § 93.103 broadly enough to encompass failure to disclose FCOI in grant
proposals or publications.29
1. Failure to Disclose FCOI Is Unlikely to Be “Falsification”
Under 42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b), “[f]alsification is manipulating research
materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that
the research is not accurately represented in the research record.”30 There are two
primary challenges for addressing failure to disclose FCOI as “falsification” under
25

Id. § 93.407.
Id. § 93.407(b).
27
Id. § 93.103.
28
Id. § 93.103(b); Botkin, supra note 2, at 2308.
29
42 C.F.R. § 93.103 (2019).
30
Id. § 93.103(b).
26
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42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b). First, the definition of “falsification” in § 93.103(b) provides
for specific acts and outcomes that must be shown to constitute “falsification” rather
than a general showing, as described by Botkin, of “offer[ing] a false picture of the
research environment.”31 Second, “falsification” is demonstrated by specified acts
and outcomes that have actually occurred. The definition does not seem to allow for
a finding when circumstances exist which may influence the conduct and reporting
of research. 32
(a) Misrepresentation of the “Research Environment” Is Not “Falsification”
According to Botkin, significant failure to disclose FCOI is “falsification”
because when “an investigator provides an incomplete or inaccurate account of his
or her affiliations,” the investigator “offers a false picture of the research
environment to funders, the research institution, research participants, and readers
of the report.”33 But 42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b) provides a definition of “falsification”
that is more specific, and more restrictive, than Botkin’s conception.34 Under 42
C.F.R. § 93.103(b), “falsification” is a set of specific actions: “manipulating research
materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results” that have
consequences for “the research” as “represented in the research record.”35 Under 42
C.F.R. § 93.222, “research” is defined as “a systematic experiment, study,
evaluation, demonstration or survey . . . .”36 Further, “Research record” is defined
by 42 C.F.R. § 93.224 as “the record of data or results that embody the facts resulting
from scientific inquiry.”37 The detailed regulatory definition of “falsification” is at
odds with a general characterization of the “research environment,” even one that is
biased toward specific findings by an FCOI not managed by an institutional plan.
Moreover, the 42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b) definition of “falsification” requires
manipulation of “materials,” “equipment,” “processes,” or changing or omitting
31

Id. § 93.103(b); Botkin, supra note 2, at 2308.
42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b).
33
Botkin, supra note 2, at 2308.
34
42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b).
35
Id. § 93.103(b).
36
Id. § 93.222 (“Research means a systematic experiment, study, evaluation,
demonstration or survey designed to develop or contribute to general knowledge (basic
research) or specific knowledge (applied research) relating broadly to public health by
establishing, discovering, developing, elucidating or confirming information about, or the
underlying mechanism relating to, biological causes, functions or effects, diseases,
treatments, or related matters to be studied.”).
37
Id. § 93.224 (“Research record means the record of data or results that embody the
facts resulting from scientific inquiry, including but not limited to, research proposals,
laboratory records, both physical and electronic, progress reports, abstracts, theses, oral
presentations, internal reports, journal articles, and any documents and materials provided to
HHS or an institutional official by a respondent in the course of the research misconduct
proceeding.”).
32
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collected data or results generated by analysis of data.38 In order for this definition
to cover failure to disclose FCOI upon submission of a sponsored research proposal
or publication, regulators would need to classify grant proposals and publications as
“research materials.”39 Neither 42 C.F.R. § 93.103 nor the Part 93 subpart B
definitions of special terms provides a definition of “research materials” or
“materials.”40 The lack of a regulatory definition of “materials” creates uncertainty
about whether an administrative law judge or a court would uphold an enforcement
action that turned on regulators’ interpretation of the term.
(b) Existence of Risk Is Insufficient for “Falsification” Under 42 C.F.R.
Part 93
The second impediment to treating failure to disclose FCOI as “falsification” is
that the regulatory definition of “falsification,” requires that the specified acts and
the effect on the research have actually occurred. Botkin’s argument, however, is
that if the noncompliance is serious enough, the failure to disclose should in itself be
deemed research misconduct because of the risk to the integrity of the research
process.41 In particular, Botkin sees the “falsification” of inaccurate FCOI
disclosures as “relevant to proposing, performing, and reporting research results”
because “[a] failure to disclose an external financial relationship may influence . . .
how the research is conducted . . . and the reporting of the results.”42 In evaluating
whether failure to disclose FCOI rises to the level of research misconduct, Botkin
does not see this as an inquiry that depends on whether there were effects on conduct
or reporting of the research.43
The “risk” approach relies on Botkin’s contention that a finding of research
misconduct can be made if the failure to disclose was “a significant departure from
accepted practices of the relevant scientific community.”44 Botkin’s argument treats
this standard, contained in 42 C.F.R. § 93.104, as an alternate definition of research
misconduct. But it is, instead, one of the standards that governs a finding of research

38

Id. § 93.103(b); see also David B. Resnick, Commentary, Is It Time to Revise the
Definition of Research Misconduct?, 26 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 123, 128 (2019) (“While
not disclosing a COI may inaccurately represent the research, it does not involve
manipulation of materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data. If not
disclosing a significant COI is to be viewed as a form of misconduct, it should be regarded
as a separate category of misbehavior, not as falsification.”).
39
42 C.F.R. § 93.103(b) (2019).
40
Id. § 93.103; id. §§ 93.200–227 (Subpart B fails to include “research materials” or
“materials” in the definition section at all).
41
Botkin, supra note 2, at 2307.
42
Id. at 2308 (emphasis added).
43
Id.
44
Id. (referring to the standards for a finding of research misconduct promulgated at 42
C.F.R. § 93.104).
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misconduct based on actions delineated in 42 C.F.R. § 93.103.45 So, both in the
adoption of a risk-based standard and the repurposing of an existing standard as an
action constituting research misconduct, Botkin’s proposed approach is markedly
different than the current law.
Botkin’s approach is also different than the mandate for handling FCOI under
42 C.F.R. Part 50. Under 42 C.F.R. Part 50, failure to disclose FCOI itself does not
automatically trigger sanctions.46 Instead, identification of noncompliance initiates
an investigation into whether the now-identified FCOI was accompanied by
“falsification” as defined under the research misconduct regulations.47 This twostage inquiry reinforces the conclusion that a finding of research misconduct is based
on occurrence of specific behaviors during the conduct of the research while FCOI
disclosure noncompliance represents a risk that such acts will occur.
2. Regulatory Guidance Is Not Clearly Supportive of Addressing FCOI
as “Falsification”
Botkin points to regulatory guidance to support his argument for a broader
reading of the definition of research misconduct and, in particular, falsification.48
According to Botkin, regulatory guidance “makes clear that a misrepresentation of
any investigator’s credentials or publications in grant applications may constitute a
fabrication or falsification in proposing research.”49 Botkin views “this situation [as]
analogous to misrepresenting financial relationships.”50
However, the cited guidance, while referring to “credentials and publications”
in the phrasing of a question, states that it is “misrepresentation of a researcher’s
qualifications or ability to perform the research [that] may constitute falsification
or fabrication in proposing research.”51 As with the regulatory definition of
“falsification,” the focus is on the conduct of the research. And even in the scenario
here, where a researcher misrepresents their qualifications, the language of “may”
rather than “shall” dictates that an additional inquiry must be undertaken into effects
on the research results. This approach parallels the two-stage inquiry established in
45

Id. at 2308; 42 C.F.R. §§ 93.103–104 (2019).
See 42 C.F.R. § 50.606.
47
Id. §§ 50.606, 93.103.
48
Botkin, supra note 2, at 2308.
49
Id. (citing Federal Research Misconduct Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,260, 76,261 (Dec.
6, 2000)). Botkin lists the Office of Research Integrity as the institutional author of the Notice
of Final Policy cited in his article. However, although the Notice of Final Policy is published
on the ORI website, the Federal Research Misconduct Policy referenced was issued by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) rather than ORI or another HHS office or
agency. ORI may, of course, refer to OSTP guidance on a federal policy in ORI decisions.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Federal Research Misconduct Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,260, 76,261 (Dec. 6, 2000)
(emphasis added).
46
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the FCOI regulations; a finding of FCOI disclosure noncompliance initiates a review
of the investigator’s research, which may lead to a finding of research misconduct.52
Therefore, regulatory guidance currently provides, at best, a weak indication that
regulators are prepared to treat FCOI disclosure noncompliance in itself as sufficient
for a finding of research misconduct.
B. Regulatory Standards for a Finding of “Research Misconduct”
The PHS regulations also provide the standards for a finding of research
misconduct as defined in 42 C.F.R. § 93.103.53 Under 42 C.F.R. § 93.104, a finding
of research misconduct requires: “(a) There be a significant departure from accepted
practices of the relevant research community; and (b) The misconduct be committed
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; and (c) The allegations be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.”54 This Note focuses its discussion on the former
two standards established in the PHS regulations. Setting aside for a moment the
legal question of whether the research misconduct regulations do cover FCOI
nondisclosure, this section analyzes whether the standards can be practically applied
to instances of “serious noncompliance” with FCOI disclosure requirements.
1. There Is No Generally Agreed Upon Practice Among Investigators for FCOI
Disclosure
Under PHS regulations, the first standard for a finding of research misconduct
is there must “be a significant departure from accepted practices of the relevant
research community.”55 In traditional research misconduct investigations conducted
by PHS, ORI makes comparisons between the conduct of the PHS-funded
investigator during the research process and the standard research and publication
practices in the investigator’s scientific field.56 For example, in Krishna Murthy, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the respondent-investigator’s argument that
“his errors are commonplace in the research community—that everyone makes and
publishes errors like the ones that he made and published.”57 The ALJ concluded the
respondent conducted his research in a manner that “significantly departed” from
the accepted practices of protein scientists to use “validation tools . . . [to] verify the
accuracy of [their] protein model” and then, adhering to an “honor system,” refrain
52

42 C.F.R. §§ 50.604–605(a)(3)(ii)(A) (2019); see also supra Part II.
42 C.F.R. § 93.103.
54
Id. § 93.104.
55
Id. § 93.104.
56
See, e.g., Krishna Murthy, DAB No. CR5007, at *1 (H.H.S. Jan. 19, 2018), 2018 WL
8368300 (amended recommended decision) (granting summary judgment upon determining
that a PHS-funded investigator, who “falsified and/or fabricated 11 protein structures and
reported them in nine publications and in twelve entries to an entity known as the Protein
Data Bank (PDB),” had engaged in research misconduct).
57
Id. at *2.
53

1358

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

from depositing models of protein structures into the Protein Data Bank that fail the
validation process.58 To translate this analysis to instances of noncompliance with
FCOI disclosure requirements, there must be a generally agreed upon FCOI
disclosure practice among the scientific research community to which research
institutions and PHS agencies could compare the conduct of a particular investigator.
As one exploratory effort to identify whether a consensus about FCOI
disclosure exists outside of the regulatory mandate for annual FCOI reporting to the
funding agency for PHS-funded investigators, I catalogued current FCOI disclosure
policies at a subset of major research universities.59 In a 2019 review of FCOI
policies at Pac-12 universities, nine of the twelve universities did not have a policy
requiring FCOI disclosure for investigators whose research was not sponsored by
external grants.60 In 2019, the three universities that had an annual FCOI disclosure
requirement for all university faculty were: Stanford University, University of
Colorado Boulder (UC-Boulder), and Oregon State University (OSU).61 In July
2020, the University of Utah joined this group by revising its policy to include a
requirement for FCOI disclosure by faculty upon hire and at the start of each
academic year.62 Yet, even within this small subgroup, there is variation. Stanford
and UC-Boulder’s policies include broad language that requires disclosure of
conflicts involving “professional obligations to the University” and “any university
responsibility,” respectively.63 OSU’s annual attestation requirement for faculty is
58

Id. at *3.
Cf. National Institute of Health, NIH Office of Extramural Research, NOT-OD-11109, Responsibility of Applicants for Promoting Objectively in Research for Which Public
Health Service Funding Is Sought and Responsible Prospective Contractors (Aug. 22, 2011),
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-11-109.html [https://perma.cc/GQ
4P-R9KK] (describing major changes to HHS regulations governing FCOI disclosure
requirements for PHS-funded investigators and their research institutions).
60
Tammy M. Frisby, Pac-12 University Policies Governing Individual FCOI
Disclosure Timing (May 10, 2019) (working paper) (on file with author).
61
Id.; see also STAN. UNIV., RESEARCH POLICY HANDBOOK, 4.1 FACULTY POLICY ON
CONFLICT OF COMMITMENT AND INTEREST, https://doresearch.stanford.edu/policies/research
-policy-handbook/conflicts-commitment-and-interest/faculty-policy-conflict-commitmentand-interest [https://perma.cc/3ADB-5LAK] (last visited June 7, 2020); UNIV. OF COLO.BOULDER, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND CONFLICT OF COMMITMENT POLICY (2019),
https://www.colorado.edu/researchinnovation/coi/policies-procedures [https://perma.cc/N8
FK-ZXFM]; OR. STATE UNIV., OSU POLICY ON RESEARCH CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2017),
https://research.oregonstate.edu/coi/about-conflict-interest-program/policy-research-confli
cts-interest [https://perma.cc/QY6B-GA6F]. But see U.C. BERKELEY, PPSM-82: CONFLICT
OF INTEREST (2020) https://policy.ucop.edu/doc/4010421/PPSM-82, [https://perma.cc/Z4JTQ4LN] (no policy provisivon requiring annual attestation of FCOI disclosure for faculty who
are not conducting sponsored-project research).
62
UNIV. OF UTAH, POLICY 1-006 INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST,
III.A.1.a.i (2020), https://regulations.utah.edu/general/1-006.php [https://perma.cc/HBE9NJTV].
63
STAN. UNIV., supra note 61; UNIV. OF COLO.-BOULDER, supra note 61.
59
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expressly limited to conflicts arising from a faculty member’s research.64 The
University of Utah policy appears to stake out a middle ground by defining
“financial relationship” as “any financial interest or relationship . . . that reasonably
appears to be related to an Investigator’s or Employee’s responsibilities to the
University, as those responsibilities are defined by the Investigator’s or Employee’s
department or job description.”65
The fact that annual FCOI disclosure requirements for non-PHS-funded
researchers are the minority policy among Pac-12 universities suggests that the
academic research community in general—despite the legally mandated annual
reporting for PHS-funded investigators—does not regard regularly updated FCOI
disclosure as an “accepted practice.” We might assume for the sake of argument that
there is a nascent but developing community standard. Yet, at best, there would
currently be a wide—although narrowing—range of “accepted practices.”
Eventually, we may be able to recognize that meaningful agreement on FCOI
has emerged among the research community. But in its current state, the lack of a
clearly articulated community standard provides grounds for a PHS-funded
investigator to mount a legal challenge to an agency determination that elevates
failure to disclose FCOI to research misconduct. Without evidence to support the
contention that “the relevant research community” has its own “accepted practices”
on proper FCOI disclosure independent of what the law makes PHS-funded
investigators do, an agency action treating noncompliance with FCOI disclosure
requirements as research misconduct is vulnerable to a challenge that the decision
was “arbitrary and capricious.”66
2. The Culpability Standard for Research Misconduct Aligns with Treating
“Serious Noncompliance” with FCOI as Research Misconduct
In contrast to the definition of research misconduct and the standard of
“accepted practices,” the existing culpability standard does not present an obstacle
to applying existing research misconduct rules to regulate FCOI disclosure. Indeed,
the culpability standard aligns with the objective of treating “serious
noncompliance” with FCOI disclosure as research misconduct. Further, the
standard, which is higher than ordinary negligence, would not assign liability in
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42 C.F.R. § 93.104 (2019). Under the Administrative Procedures Act, courts are
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cases in which an investigator makes an honest mistake or is merely careless in their
recordkeeping and disclosure.67
Botkin does not define “serious noncompliance.”68 This Note proposes the
following working definition: failure to disclose significant financial interests that
(a) occurs despite notice of the obligation to report and (b) is characterized by either
(1) a pattern of nondisclosure or (2) an incident of nondisclosure that creates an
appearance of corruption to a reasonable layperson. Given that Botkin’s proposal is
not motivated by the desire to penalize absent-minded professors, some level of
culpability is called for.69 Setting the required mental state at a level above ordinary
negligence would further reduce the likelihood of mistakenly treating honest errors,
inadvertent oversights, and poor paperwork management skills as acts that are
deserving of significant sanctions, such as limitations on federal funding that support
the investigator’s public health research.70
The mental state that must be shown for a finding of research misconduct under
PHS regulations is the conduct must be “committed intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.”71 In Brodie v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,72 the
district court was presented with the issue of the proper culpability standard for
research misconduct that occurred from 1999–2002, under an earlier version of the
HHS regulations that were silent on the required mental state, except to exclude
“honest error.”73 The court’s decision, which is consistent with the current
culpability thresholds, provides a helpful delineation of conduct that rises to the
required standard and that which does not.74
In Brodie, PHS-funded molecular biologist, Scott Brodie, brought an action
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) challenging an HHS ALJ’s ruling
debarring him from receiving federal research funding for seven years based on the
finding that the investigator had committed research misconduct.75 In 2008, ORI
filed a charge of research misconduct against Brodie following the conclusion of a
research misconduct investigation by Brodie’s research institution, the University of
67

See 42 C.F.R. § 93.104.
Botkin, supra note 2, at 2308.
69
See id. at 2307 (“It is time to strengthen institutional COI policies by considering the
intentional or negligent failure to disclose significant financial relationships relevant to the
conduct of research to be research misconduct.”).
70
42 C.F.R. § 93.407 (governing PHS-imposed sanctions for research misconduct).
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Id. § 93.104.
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796 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C. 2011).
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Id. at 148, 151 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (2002)) (“Misconduct or Misconduct in
Science means fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate
from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing,
conducting, or reporting research. It does not include honest error or honest differences in
interpretations or judgments of data.”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 93.104 (2019) (specifying
standards for a finding of research misconduct).
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75
Id. at 148.
68

2020]

TREATING FAILURE TO DISCLOSE FCOI

1361

Washington, which resulted in termination of Brodie’s employment.76 In a hearing
before an ALJ, Brodie argued the ORI had not used the proper culpability standard
in its determination that he had committed research misconduct when he submitted
grant applications, published scientific articles, or made professional presentations
using false or fabricated images.77 In district court, Brodie argued that the ALJ’s
decision upholding the ORI’s finding was “arbitrary and capricious” because the
ALJ applied an improperly low standard of culpability, that of recklessness, in
making its determination.78
The district court upheld the ALJ’s determination that “the new definition of
misconduct was simply a ‘clarification’ of the older definition of misconduct.”79
Assigning liability for recklessness, which was now stipulated as a sufficient mental
state under the new regulations, was also consistent with the earlier regulatory
language because recklessness encompasses “conduct [that] is not the product of
‘honest error.’”80
For purposes of administering current HHS regulations, the Brodie decision
speaks to the showing that must be made to establish that conduct was reckless and
not “honest error.”81 Citing a different HHS Departmental Appeals Board decision
on a research misconduct charge, Sharma,82 the district court stated that recklessness
could be established when “statements are made with knowledge that they would
mislead the reader.”83 This type of conduct, “as opposed to mere negligence,
constituted misconduct.”84 As applied to the facts in Brodie, the court concluded:
“Publication of false or fabricated images with indifference to the truth of [their]
contents is conduct done with knowledge that it would mislead the reader. Such
conduct is not the product of honest error.”85 The district court upheld the ALJ’s
determination that a showing of “indifference to the truth,” as distinct from simple
negligence, was sufficiently supported by the “mass and pattern of the false images
and the nature of the false images—for which the alterations fundamentally
[changed] the description and meaning of [the] contents.”86
The current culpability standard for research misconduct is an appropriate one
for identifying bad actors related to FCOI nondisclosure, both in terms of the mental
state required and the showing necessary to establish the mental state.
First, regarding the mental state, the policy concern is not that well-intentioned
investigators might fail to stay on top of their FCOI reporting paperwork or neglect
76
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to proofread the disclosures statement in an academic journal article. These
oversights could be characterized as ordinary negligence. A higher culpability
standard than mere negligence would target the regulatory scheme at bad actors who
are, at the least, willfully indifferent to risks to research integrity.
Second, the Brodie standard for the showing of recklessness, the lowest
culpability level under existing regulations, should effectively distinguish between
sneaky bad actors and mere negligence in FCOI disclosure as well as it does in
traditional research misconduct adjudications. As found in Brodie, the standard of
“indifference to the truth” could be demonstrated by a pattern of nondisclosure that
occurs even when an investigator receives repeated notice of the obligation to
disclose.87 But a pattern may not be a necessary showing. Indifference, and the
Brodie corollary that conduct would be “done with knowledge that it would mislead”
consumers of the research,88 may be even clearer in singular instances of failure to
report FCOI that create an obvious appearance of corruption (e.g., receipt of large
speaking fees from a pharmaceutical company that manufactures the drug evaluated
in the investigator’s published journal article).
So, in spite of the other challenges for treating FCOI nondisclosure as research
misconduct under the current regulations, there are ready legal standards for
culpability that could be applied. These standards and the accompanying showings
would assign liability where reformers like Botkin would like to see accountability.
Moreover, the standards would not stymie the research programs of investigators
who may need to be more diligent but are not blameworthy underminers of research
integrity.
C. Agency Rulemaking in Response to Federal Policy for Research Misconduct
HHS’s latitude to modify the PHS definition of “research misconduct” is
constrained by the Department’s own history of rulemaking on the subject. But,
87
Id.; see also Krishna Murthy, DAB No. CR5007, at *5 (H.H.S. Jan. 19, 2018), 2018
WL 8368300 (concluding that PHS-funded investigator was at the least “[recklessly]
indifferent to what his experimental data actually showed” on the grounds that the
respondent’s protein models contained “gross errors” and there was “a pattern to
[r]espondent’s conduct” of repeatedly publishing or depositing into databanks data corrupted
by the same type of errors. The ALJ contrasted the nature of respondent’s conduct with
ordinary negligence: “Everyone makes mistakes from time to time and perfection is not a
standard for judging any research’s work pursuant to the regulations governing misconduct
in science. A scientist might deposit a protein model in the [Protein Data Bank] that contains
innocent or trivial errors without intending to defraud and without indifference to the truth
of his or her submission. But, no honest researcher would deposit or publish so many false
models or so much false data as Respondent published or deposited. The sheer number of
false submissions by [r]espondent over the course of nearly a decade is as damning as is the
character of what he deposited and published.”).
88
Brodie, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (citing Sharma, DAB No. 1431, at *8 (H.H.S. Aug.
6, 1993), 1993 WL 742551).
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before cataloging those obstacles, we should recognize that the HHS Secretary has
the statutory authority to establish the definition of “research misconduct” for Public
Health Service research. Under 42 U.S.C. § 289(a)(3)(A), the Secretary is granted
the discretion to define “research misconduct”: “The Secretary shall by regulation
establish a definition for the term ‘research misconduct’ for purposes of this
section.”89 Assessing the Secretary’s authority more broadly, under 42 U.S.C. §
241(a):
The Secretary shall conduct in the Service, and encourage, cooperate with,
and render assistance to other appropriate public authorities, scientific
institutions, and scientists in the conduct of, and promoting the
coordination of, research, investigations, experiments, demonstrations,
and studies relating to the causes, diagnosis, treatment, control, and
prevention of physical and mental diseases and impairments of man . . . .90
So, in statutory language related to the scope of the HHS Secretary’s authority, there
is, respectively, an express specific grant to define research misconduct and a
general grant that both support the Secretary’s authority to establish a PHS Policy
that “serious noncompliance” with FCOI disclosure may be treated as “research
misconduct.”
That said, HHS rulemakers may be constrained by the regulatory history of the
current PHS research misconduct regulations, which were drafted during a 2004–
2005 rulemaking process in order to bring PHS regulations into conformity with the
government-wide Federal Policy on Research Misconduct issued by the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) on December 6, 2000.91
While HHS made some modifications to the OSTP rule, such as excluding
authorship disputes from the definition of plagiarism, the HHS policy largely
adopted the OSTP definition of research misconduct, as well as the elements
necessary for a finding of research misconduct.92
In the Supplementary Information provided with the publication of the Public
Health Services Policies on Research Misconduct Final Rule, HHS recognized the
“OSTP goal of a more uniform, Federal-wide approach.”93 Furthermore, in the
Department’s response to “Significant Comments Not Resulting in Changes”
regarding the definition of “research misconduct,” HHS rulemakers expressly
addressed their intent to adhere closely to the OSTP policy.94 As stated in the Final
Rule: “Given the careful consideration that has been given to this definition and the
89
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value of a uniform government-wide definition, we are adopting the definition as it
was proposed.”95 HHS’s prioritization of consistency with OSTP Federal Policy is
reinforced by its decision to address, as the first question in the question-and-answer
section of the Final Rule, an inquiry about whether the HHS rule was consistent with
“the goal of the OSTP Federal Policy on Research Misconduct to provide a more
uniform Federal-wide approach.”96 Taken together, these statements convey the
intent of HHS rulemakers to draft a research misconduct rule that does not deviate
from Federal Policy. Accordingly, unilateral action by HHS to re-interpret research
misconduct to cover FCOI would represent a deviation from Federal Policy that,
whatever its merits for promoting research integrity, would be a significant departure
from the intent of HHS rulemakers to bring uniformity to this area of administrative
law during the 2004–2005 rulemaking process. If HHS attempts to widen its
conception of research misconduct under the current rules, strategic respondents in
enforcement actions will question how the agency claims to justify its new-found
desire to exempt itself from the uniform policy across the executive branch.
Furthermore, the definition of research misconduct adopted with the revised
regulation removed language that supported a broader reading. Under the version of
42 C.F.R. § 50.102 in effect at the time of the rulemaking, “‘Misconduct’ or
‘Misconduct in Science’ meant fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other
practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the
scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting research.”97 The
decision to remove “other practices” from the definition of research misconduct
supports an interpretation that rulemakers intended to narrow and precisely define
actions that constitute research misconduct.98
D. Structural Indications that FCOI Are Distinct from Research Misconduct
Another possible limitation on the treatment of FCOI nondisclosure as research
misconduct under 42 C.F.R. § 93.103 is the structure of the HHS regulations
governing FCOI disclosure and research misconduct. There are two primary features
of the codified regulations that support the position that HHS rulemakers viewed
FCOI disclosure noncompliance as distinct from research misconduct: (1) the
relocation of the research misconduct rules during the 2004–2005 rulemaking
process; and (2) the absence of language in either the FCOI or research misconduct
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rules that indicates that the FCOI and research misconduct rules might work in
tandem to address certain violations of research integrity.
1. Separation of FCOI and Research Misconduct Rules During the 2004–2005
Rulemaking Process
First, the FCOI and research misconduct rules are intentionally located in
different Parts of the HHS regulations. The 2004–2005 HHS rulemaking process
removed the research misconduct rules from subpart A of 42 C.F.R. Part 50 while
leaving the FCOI rules, in their entirety, in subpart F of that same Part.99 The HHS
Final Rule for the revised research misconduct regulations promulgated at 42 C.F.R.
Part 93 describes the new regulations as the “new, more comprehensive part 93.”100
If HHS rulemakers understood any portion of the FCOI rules in subpart F of 42
C.F.R. Part 50 to be relevant to regulation of “research misconduct,” it would seem
to run counter to the design of a “more comprehensive” regulatory scheme to sever
the new regulations from existing related rules. Further, the public comments and
the agency’s responses contained in the HHS Final Rule do not mention investigator
conflicts of interest.101 This lack of public discussion during the 2004–2005
rulemaking process about how the revised research misconduct rules and existing
FCOI regulations might support one another—or conflict in any way—suggests that
both stakeholders and the agency saw research misconduct and FCOI as distinct
types of conduct governed by separate rules.
2. Absence of Language Establishing a Relationship Between FCOI and Research
Misconduct
The argument for treating FCOI of any severity as research misconduct is
further weakened by the absence of language in either 42 C.F.R. Part 50 or Part 93
that supports the inference that some conduct covered by the FCOI rules might also
be covered by the research misconduct rules. Prior to the 2004–2005 HHS
rulemaking process, the FCOI rules located in subpart F of 42 C.F.R. Part 50 did not
contain any connecting language to the research misconduct rules located in subpart
A of that same Part.102 Even more salient, HHS rulemakers did not add such
language to either Part during the 2004–2005 rulemaking process when the research
misconduct rules were removed from 42 C.F.R. Part 50 and relocated to 42 C.F.R.
99
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Part 93,103 nor was connecting language added when the FCOI rules were revised in
2011.104 The lack of connecting language between the FCOI rules left in 42 C.F.R.
Part 50 and the research misconduct rules relocated to 42 C.F.R. Part 93 suggests
that HHS rulemakers did not see a need to maintain a relationship between the two
sets of rules. The 2004–2005 HHS rulemakers did not, for example, include
language to the effect that FCOI nondisclosure may rise to the level of research
misconduct covered by 42 C.F.R. Part 93.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the preceding Part lays out, a PHS-funded investigator could bring a viable
legal challenge to an effort by a PHS funding-agency to treat failure to disclose FCOI
in itself as research misconduct. Whether a charged investigator used some or all of
the definitional, standards-based, or structural and historical arguments about the
existing regulations, the agency’s decision would be highly susceptible to being
overruled by a district court as arbitrary and capricious. In short, it is unlikely that
current PHS regulations governing research misconduct could be used to address
“serious noncompliance” with FCOI disclosure requirements.
One possible reaction to this conclusion is that the PHS regulations should be
revised to expressly cover at least the most egregious cases of FCOI nondisclosure
under the research misconduct rules. While this course of regulatory reform is not
entirely improbable, the rulemaking process might, of course, take years to produce
a final rule if it was successful at all. Moreover, the HHS Office of Research
Integrity, which has primary oversight of research misconduct, has issued no public
statement that revision of the research misconduct regulations is on its rulemaking
agenda.105
The question then presents itself: What actions could reasonably be taken, short
of a call for a new HHS rulemaking process, to address “serious noncompliance”
with FCOI disclosure requirements by a PHS-funded investigator?
The logical first stop is with research institutions, which bear the primary—and
the frontline—responsibility for policing FCOI among PHS-funded investigators
under current regulations.106 Research institutions are permitted to establish more
stringent internal standards for research misconduct than those provided by PHS
regulations.107 The PHS regulation on institutional standards expressly grants
103
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independent enforcement authority to research institutions: “[A]n institution may
find conduct to be actionable under its standards even if the action does not meet
this part’s definition of research misconduct.”108 The regulation reinforces the
autonomy of research institutions to set and enforce their own, more expansive,
standards for research misconduct by stipulating that research institutions are
allowed to come to different findings than emerge from a parallel HHS investigation:
“An HHS finding or settlement does not affect institutional findings or
administrative actions based on an institution’s internal standards of conduct.”109
Therefore, there is no clear regulatory barrier to research institutions taking it upon
themselves to revise their own research misconduct policies to establish disciplinary
procedures for FCOI disclosure noncompliance.
Research institutions may be reluctant to unilaterally adopt an internal standard
for research misconduct that incorporates FCOI nondisclosure. Research institutions
would be reasonably concerned about hampering the recruitment and retention of
investigators who bring in millions of dollars in PHS-funding but also have
significant FCOI from their connections to medical and pharmaceutical companies.
But research institutions should be motivated to coordinate across institutions
to adopt more rigorous enforcement of and sanctions for “severe noncompliance”
with FCOI disclosure.110 If research institutions can successfully self-regulate, they
may stave off any federal regulatory effort to fold FCOI nondisclosure into the HHS
research misconduct rules.
The incentive for institutions to avoid federal rulemaking on this issue is
clear—and very expensive. If FCOI nondisclosure is research misconduct under
federal law, whistleblowers might test whether federal courts will allow qui tam suits
under the False Claims Act (FCA) against PHS-funded research institutions for an
investigator’s “severe noncompliance” with FCOI disclosure. Although the likely
viability of such a suit is a legal question that deserves its own full analysis, suffice
it to say for our purposes here that universities would risk significant legal liability.
The cautionary example of the extent of institutional FCA liability for
investigator research misconduct under the federal rules became public news in
2016.111 A former researcher at Duke University brought a qui tam claim against
108
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Duke alleging the university fraudulently accepted more than $200 million in federal
research funding when it oversaw another PHS-funded investigator who engaged in
research misconduct, as defined under 42 C.F.R. § 50.112 Under the FCA, Duke faced
potential liability of up to three times the amount of any federal funds found to have
been fraudulently obtained.113 According to attorney Joel Androphy, who specializes
in FCA litigation, the lawsuit against Duke “should scare all [research] institutions
around the country.”114 In 2019, Duke University reached a $112.5 million
settlement with the federal government.115 Rather than being a stunningly expensive
aberration, FCA litigators view the Duke suit as part of a growing trend of FCA
claims against research institutions.116 In the last decade, there have been highprofile FCA suits against University of Texas Health Sciences Center, Brigham and
Women’s Hospital & Massachusetts General Hospital, and Weill Medical College
of Cornell University, all involving claims of PHS-defined research misconduct.117
In the absence of coordinated action by research institutions to address serious
failures to disclose FCOI through their institutional policies, the most effective
approach for addressing the problem of noncompliance with institutional FCOI
disclosure requirements may be through PHS agencies. Under current regulations,
PHS funding-agencies have regulatory authority to penalize investigators for
nondisclosure of FCOI.118 PHS agencies could announce they will step up their
enforcement of FCOI regulations under 42 C.F.R. § 50.606(b).119 Under that
provision, a PHS agency “may decide that a particular financial conflict of interest
will bias the objectivity of the PHS-funded research to such an extent that further
corrective action is needed . . . .”120 However, relying on agency discretion for more
vigorous enforcement of the less well-developed FCOI regulations is a far cry from
the kind of active funding-agency involvement that may be required to reduce the
influence of FCOI on medical and other public health research.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that a court would find that current HHS regulations provide legal
authority for PHS funding-agencies to address “serious noncompliance” with FCOI
disclosure requirements as research misconduct. With one exception—the
culpability standard for research misconduct—the administrative law governing bias
and integrity in PHS-funded research does not support treating even the most serious
cases of failure to disclose FCOI in itself as research misconduct in violation of PHS
regulations. Indeed, there are at least four features of that law which would support
a claim that an HHS action to treat FCOI nondisclosure as research misconduct was
“arbitrary and capricious.” First, “serious noncompliance” with institutional FCOI
disclosure requirements does not fall within the definition of “research misconduct”
under 42 C.F.R. § 93.103. Second, one of the regulatory standards for a finding of
research misconduct rests on a comparison with the “accepted practices” within the
“relevant research community,” and there is currently no discernable consensus on
FCOI disclosure requirements among major research institutions sufficient to
establish clear parameters of “accepted practices.” Third, the intent behind the 2004–
2005 rulemaking process that revised research misconduct policies across agencies
of the federal government, including NIH, was to create a uniform federal policy on
research misconduct—a historical legacy that may throw up legal constraints to any
agency’s unilateral effort to reshape the contours of administrative actions for
research misconduct. Fourth, the regulatory structure within Title 42 of the C.F.R.
that was created by the 2004–2005 rulemaking process supports the conclusion that
HHS rulemakers saw FCOI nondisclosure as distinct from research misconduct.
Short of new HHS rulemaking, there are viable options under current PHS
research misconduct and FCOI disclosure rules to pursue more aggressive responses
to “serious noncompliance” with FCOI disclosure. Research institutions are
permitted to establish—and enforce—more stringent internal standards for research
misconduct than those provided by PHS regulations. Although individual
institutions may be reluctant to risk putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage
in attracting top researchers by unilaterally adopting more stringent FCOI disclosure
requirements, the emerging legal risk of False Claims Act (FCA) lawsuits could spur
collective action. In the interest of reducing their legal exposure to FCA claims under
HHS research misconduct regulations, institutions may decide they are better off
coordinating on self-regulation of FCOI. Otherwise, lawmakers and regulators—
perhaps spurred by high profile incidents like Baselga at Memorial Sloan
Kettering—may decide to step in where institutions neglect to tread. In the
meantime, the best that those concerned with the impact of FCOI on research
integrity can hope for may be PHS agencies becoming more active in using their
authority to review FCOI nondisclosure as a backstop to institutional inaction.

